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ABATEMENT OF CRIMINAL LITIGATION
IN DISSOLUTION BY MERGER:
A MODERN ANACHRONISM*
IT IS a maxim of the common law that all litigation to which a cor-
poration is a party abates on dissolution.' Although the doctrine is
said to rest on the analogy between corporate and natural' persons, 2 it
was apparently extended at old common law, somewhat anomalously,
to apply to some causes of action which, if brought against an individual,
would survive death.'
* United States v. Line Material Co., zoz F.2d 9z9 (6th Cir. 1953).
1z Kyr, LAW OF CORPORATIONS, 5 16 (1794). This rule evolved in a time when
all corporations were municipal, ecclesiastical, or eleemosynary, and business corpora-
tions were unknown. See Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations, 58 HARv. L.
REV. 675, 678 (x945). "Practically, it has never been applied, in England, to in-
solvent or dissolved moneyed corporations. . . ." ANGELL & AMES, CORPORATIONS
§ 779 a (iith ed. 1882), and it has been doubted whether the rule ever existed in
New York. See Shayne v. Evening Post Publishing Co., 168 N.Y. 70, 76, 61 N.E.
ii5, 116 (i9oi). Many courts in the United States have stated this to be the common
law rule, without too deep an inquiry into its origin or soundness, e.g., United States
v. Alexander, Z4 Fed. Cas. 769, No. 14,428 (D.C. Cir. 1833) ; cf. Broughton v.
Pennsacola, 93 U.S. 266 (1876)i and cases cited Note, 47 A.L.R. 1z88, 1353 ff.
(1927). Coincident with the extinguishment of liability, actions by or against the
corporation were also abated. Id. at i38o ff. and cases cited therein. But again
such a doctrine was the result of uncritical analogy with non-business corporations.
21 AM. JUR. § 52 at p. 55 (1936)i I C.J.S. § 1oz at p. 140 (1936); 16
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA. CORPORATIONS § 8139 (Rev. vol. 1942) (stating that even
at common law many actions survived). And see, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Com-
pany v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. z57, 259 (1977) (dissolution occurring under statutes
silent as to continuance of the existence of dissolved corporations for purposes of suit),
citing inter alia, Mumma v. Potomac Company, 8 Pet. z8 (U.S. 1834). Also see
Chicago Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120 (x937) ; Defense Supplies
Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 63 (x949).
'At common law, apparently no criminal actions against individuals survived
death. See Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 86 (1884), nor did most causes
based on tort, PROSSER, TORTS § 103 (1941). But where the tortfeasor benefited by
his act, the action survived against the executor, Hambly v. Trott, I Cowp. 37I ,
98 Eng. Rep. 1136 (776) ; and most causes based on contract survived, 6 WILLIS'ON,
CONTRACTS § 194.5 (Rev. ed. 1938).
Because of the non-business nature of the old common law corporations, however,
upon dissolution personalty may have escheated to the King, (No clear authority
for escheat can be found, although text writers and some cases consistently refer to the
escheat as established practice. Kyd stated that "What becomes of the personal estate
is, perhaps, not decided; but probably it vests in the crown." z KYD, op. cit., tupra
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Application of this doctrine, however, has not been rigid. It has
been judicially tempered through the years to permit the satisfaction
of civil claims against a dissolved corporation out of the assets of its
liquidating estate4 and even its stockholder distributees,5 particularly
in a merger situation. 6 But, apparently, no suggestion is found in the
common law that penal actions may survive corporate dissolution.7 In
addition, today, most states have enacted statutes conferring on a cor-
poration the capacity to sue and be sued for a specified period of time
after dissolution" or merger59 but these statutes have not been common-
ly interpreted to comprehend criminal litigation. 10
note 6, at 516) and the realty reverted to the donors. i BL. CoMM. *484. Evi-
dently, not even contract actions or "benefiting" tort actions survived corporate dis-
solution. See i BL. COMM. *484.
'See Note, 47 A.L.R. iz88, 1355 ff. (1927).
'Marcus, supra note i, at 68o, citing 8 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS § 6572 ( 3 d
ed. 1927). Also see Note, 15 A.L.R. 1ii2, 1114 ff. (1921).
a 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 7180 (Rev. vol. 1938) ; Note, 89
Am. St. Rep. 604, 648 (903).
7 1 Am. JUR. § 54 at p. 58 (1936). In United States v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765
(E.D. La. 1942), the court granted a motion to abate indictment on the ground that
the corporation had dissolved under Texas law. While referring to the Texas statutes
to determine corporate existence, the court, somewhat surprisingly, held that the ques-
tion on the motion for abatement must be determined without respect to the Texas
statute which would have continued the liability of the corporation in this instance,
inasmuch as an infraction of federal law was involved. In the absence of an applicable
federal statute, the court reasoned that it must reach its decision in accordance with
the principles of common law existing prior to the Declaration of Independence, Id.
at 766. Such reasoning, if not the result, is contra to the rationale in United States
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., i4o F.2d 834 (ioth Cir. 1944), and the present case. See
also Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (i933); Rosen v. United States, 245
U.S. 467, 470-472 (i917); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 465-
4758(941).
' Continuance of the corporation for purposes of suit is usually set out in the
"winding up" sections of the statute. E.g., CAL. CORP. C.A. § 5400 (1953); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6io.i8, 612.32, 612.47 (1944) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 155, § 51 (1948) ;
N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 14:13-4 (1939); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 29 (1943) and
N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 105(8) (295i); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-132 (1950); Wis.
STAT. § 181.02 (1947).
0E.g., CAL. CORP. C.A. § 4116 (i953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 612.41 (-944)5
MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 156, § 46c (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 14:12-5
(1939)5 N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 9 o , 91(6) (1951); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-168
(1950); WIS. STAT. § I8i.o6(8c) (I947).
"United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., i4o F.2d 834 (ioth Cir. 1944) ; United
States v. Borden Co., 28 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ill. 1939). In the Safeway case
defendant corporation made a bona fide dissolution shortly before the return of an
indictment under the Sherman Act. The court found that none of the statutes of the
states involved provided for the survival of criminal actions. As a matter of fact,
after the Safeway "dissolution" a "new" corporation carried on the business with
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Whether criminal litigation survives a corporate merger was re-
cently considered in United States v. Line Material Company." Line
Material and two other corporations were alleged to have engaged in
monopolistic and restrictive practices in the manufacture and sale of
street lighting equipment in the United States. 2 After having been
indicted for alleged violation of sections one and two of the Sherman
Anti-trust Act,'3 the defendant, a Delaware corporation, vertically
merged in good faith with another corporation. The indictment was
dismissed. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, after
making the usual finding that at common law all litigation to which
a corporation is a party abates upon dissolution, 4 affirmed" on the
ground that the law of the state of incorporation made no provision
for survival of criminal litigation after corporate dissolution by merger.
Section 42 of the Delaware Corporation Law provides that dis-
solved corporations shall be continued for three years "for the purpose
of prosecuting and defending suits by or against them, and of enabling
them gradually to settle and dose their business.., provided, however,
that with respect to any action, suit or proceeding" commenced prior to
the same name, property, stockholders, etc. Marcus, supra note x at 704.
In the Borden case defendant corporations executed a bona fide merger approxi-
mately two and a half years before an indictment was returned under the Sherman
Act; thereafter, the merged corporation sold out and dissolved. The court construed
section 6o of the Delaware Corporation Law to abate the criminal action. (It is
interesting to note that, although the court put the abatement on the ground of the
earlier merger, in fact the corporation later "truly" dissolved before abatement was
pleaded.)
11 20z F.zd 929 (6th Cir. 1953).
loTranscript of Record, p. 9. United States v. Line Material Co., ibid.
"26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (937), -5 U.S.C. §§ & 2
(.946).
14 Bur cf. Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., io5 N.J. Eq. 6z, 349 Atl. 36 (930)
(merger of two corporations not equivalent to statutory dissolution). Presumably,
a federal criminal statute expressly providing for prosecution of state-dissolved cor-
porations would prevail over state law. Cf. Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 346 (19o4). The fact that a statute imposes a liability in the nature
of a penalty has not always been regarded as detisive against its survival. Cf. Union
Market Nat'l Bank v. Gardiner, 276 Mass. 490, 177 N.E. 68z, 79 A.L.R. 1512 (933).
In a merger situation see Miller Management Co. v. State, 14o Tex. 370, x67 S.W. 2d
728 (1943) (Under Tennessee statute the corporation continued in existence, for pur-
poses of defending and disposing of suit brought by the state of Texas for recovery
of penalties for transaction of intra-state business in Texas without a permit.). Cf.
Terry Packing v. Southern Exp. Co., 143 S.C. 1, 1x S.E. 144 (1927) (Consolidated
express company organized under Director General held liable for statutory penalties
due from one of the consolidated companies.).
"Although significant differences are apparent between "true" dissolution, and
dissolution by merger, the court in the present case based its decision on the reasoning
in the Safeway and Borden cases, discussed supra note xo.
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or within three years after dissolution, they shall be continued beyond
the three year period." (emphasis supplied) Section 62 provides that
"[a]ny action or proceeding pending by or against any [corporation]
merged may be prosecuted ... as if such merger had not taken place
or the corporation resulting from . . . such ...merger may be sub-
stituted in its place.' 7 (emphasis supplied)
Noting that the word "suits" was the "dominating term" of section
42, and that by general usage it refers only to civil litigation, the court
reasoned that the words "action" and "proceeding" appearing in the
same section and in section 62 must be similarly restricted."8 As further
buttressing this conclusion, the court also observed that the substitution
of parties permitted by section 62 is not characteristic of a criminal
prosecution."
On a purely verbal level, while it is true, as the court noted, that
the word "suits" generally refers only to civil litigation, ° the same
cannot unequivocally be said of the words "action"'" and "proceed-
ing."22  The court's unconditional equation of these words in this
context, therefore, is not beyond exception. Particularly is this so
in view of the fact that section 62 is expressly applicable to "any action
or proceeding" (emphasis supplied), and does not even mention "suit."
Accordingly, it may be plausibly argued that section 62 saves criminal
litigation in dissolutions by merger despite the fact that section 42 may
not similarly operate in the winding up of a "truly" dissolved corpora-
tion.
Nor do the court's conclusions appear to be irresistibly compelled
by policy considerations.-' The ancient analogy between corporate and
"
8 DEL. REV. CODE c. 65, § 42 (1935, as amended, 1951).
"' Id. at § 6z.
18 United States v. Line Material Co., 2o2 F.2d 929 (1953).
1
'1d. at 930.
20 40 WoRDs AND PHRASES 634 et seq. (i940); e.g., Pope v. State, 124 Ga. 8ox,
804, 53 S.E. 384, 385 (19o6)5 Patterson v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 178 Mich.
288, 291, 144 N.W. 491, 492 (1913). But contra, Commonwealth v. Moore, 143 Mass.
136, 137, 9 N.E. 25, 26 (1886); see also Kelliher v. People, 71 Colo. 25, 26, 2o5
Pac. 274 (1922) ("Suit," when construed with other provisions of the original action
of which the section was a part, includes criminal proceedings.).
22 WORDS AND PHRASES 16 et seq. (1940)5 "Action" includes criminal prosecu-
tions: People v. Elliott, 172 N.Y. 146, 64 N.E. 837 (1902); Lower v. State, xo9 Neb.
590, 593, 191 N.W. 674, 676 (1923)i Mason v. United States, i F.2d 279, 28o
(1924). Contra: United States v. Cleveland, 281 Fed. 249, 253 (1922) ; Common-
wealth v. Gallup, 275 Mass. 320, 335, 175 N.E. 718, 725 (1931)5 ef. State v.
Schomber, 23 Wash. 573, 576, 63 Pac. 22i, 222 (1900).
" "Proceeding" includes criminal proceedings: e.g., State v. Nelson, 6 Wash. 2d.
190, 193, 107 P.2d 1113, 1115 (194o). "Criminal proceeding" is common usage,
see io WORDS AND PHRASES 538 et seq. (940).
23 If one assumes arguendo that Line Material was guilty of restraint, monopoliza-
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natural persons would seem to be a frail reed, at best, upon which to
rest a conclusion as to whether or not criminal litigation survives cor-
poration dissolution-particularly in cases of dissolution by merger,
where the continuity of management, ownership, and properties finds
no ready anthropomorphic cognate.
Although it may be contended that the possible unjust enrichment
of the successor corporation is mitigated by potential treble damage
suits,24 which have been held to be maintainable after dissolution or
merger,"25 it is notorious that this remedy is more theoretical than real .2
Further, the effectiveness of injunctive relief,27 is dubiousi 28 and the
difficulties inherent in pursuing individual corporate directors, 21 whom
the anti-trust laws make jointly liable for corporate derelictions, render
this alternative of little practical value.30
tion, and pricing agreement as charged, its merger, albeit for bona fide purposes,
would produce an even greater monopolization as result of the vertical combihation.
See BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 316 f. (1940). If it
were later determined that such a merger violated the anti-trust acts because of the
continuance of practices deemed wrongful in the case of the old Line Material Com-
pany and/or its combination with the emerging corporation, the federal government
must retrace its steps and seek a new indictment against the surviving corporation. The
attendant expense, waste, and tactical folly of such duplicity seems apparent. See
HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS 9o-9 z (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
24. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), - 5 U.S.C. § 15 (1946).
2' United States v. Bates Valve Bag Corp., 39 F.ad z62 (D. Del. 1930), see New-
mark v. Abeel, 1o2 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
21See Comment, Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement, 49 YALE L.J. 284
(1939) i Donovan and Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-Trust Lawy, 88
U. OF PA. L. REV. 511 (1940). For an excellent exhaustive treatment recognizing
the defects, but showing the place of private actions in anti-trust enforcement, see
Comment, Antitrust Enforcement By Private Parties: Analysis of Developments it; the
Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1oxo (195z).
27 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1946)5 38 STAT. 737 (1914), IS U.S.C.
§ 26 (1946). There is dicta to the effect that criminal contempt action under such
an injunction may be enforced against a successor corporation, whether the business
has been transferred as a means of evading the judgment or for other reasons. United
.States v. American Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1951), citing Walling v.
Reuter Co., 321 U.S. 671, 674 (1943).
s It has been reasoned that the injunction simply declares practices already illegal
(and illegal in the criminal sense, United States v. Swift, 188 Fed. 92 (N.D. Ill.
191), and offers no real deterrent until after the injunction is issued. Berge, Reme-
dies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act, 7 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
104 (i94o). Also see Comments, 61 YALE L.J. 1oo (1952)5 49 YALE L.J. 284
(1939), both cited supra note 26. In dealing with the Line Material situation, this
shortcoming in injunctive relief appears multiplied.
20 38 STAT. 738 (19-4), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (946).
'°OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAW 827 (1948), cited at note
5 of Daniel, Enforcement of The Sherman Act By Actions for Treble Damages, 34
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Corporate crimes are sui generis in nature.3 ' Few, if any, of the
policy considerations which urge that the crime be permitted to die with
the criminal are relevant--especially where the fictitious death is ef-
fected in dissolution by merger. Further, in an anti-trust context, the
survival of quasi-criminal and unquestionably punitive 2 treble damage
suits reduces to sheerest sophistry the unrelieved abatement of nominal-
ly criminal litigation. Although some forward-looking court might
have been expected to pierce the veil of dissolution-merger and ap-
proach the problem in realistic terms, they have, perhaps understand-
ably, been reluctant to dose loopholes in the criminal law, rather
leaving this task to the appropriate legislative bodies.
CHARLES E. RusHING
VA. L. REV. 9oi (1948). It has been pointed out that only after the government
has been successful in a criminal action or won an equity decree that private parties
can make an effective case. Berge, Some Problems in the Enforcement of the Anti-
trust Laws, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 462, 470 (1940). Also see Comment, 49 YALE L.J.
284 (939), supra note 26.
"The anti-trust "crime" in action operates similarly to a tort by which defendant
corporation is unjustly enriched, a fortiori, enrichment to the emerging corporation
in a merger situation. There has been some thought that regardless of individual
actions the government should be able to act for the damage done the public; that
the public interest is poorly served by leaving to private parties the burden of enforce-
ment is evident. See Berge, supra note 30.
"See SOUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 34 (949). But a contrary result
is reached in Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Com-
pensatory?, 38 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940).
